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ABSTRACT
The concept of leader–follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays
a central role in a number of real–world applications of game the-
ory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly
investigated, results with multiple followers are only sporadic and
the problem of designing and evaluating computationally tractable
equilibrium-finding algorithms is still largely open. In this work,
we focus on the fundamental case where multiple followers play a
Nash equilibrium once the leader has committed to a strategy—as
we illustrate, the corresponding equilibrium finding problem can
be easily shown to be FNP–hard and not in Poly–APX unless
P = NP and therefore it is one among the hardest problems to
solve and approximate. We propose nonconvex mathematical pro-
gramming formulations and global optimization methods to find
both exact and approximate equilibria, as well as a heuristic black
box algorithm. All the methods and formulations that we introduce
are thoroughly evaluated computationally.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.2.11 [Artificial Intelligence]: Multi–agent systems
General Terms
Algorithms, Economics, Experimentation
Keywords
Game Theory (cooperative and non–cooperative), Equilibrium com-
putation
1. INTRODUCTION
The design of computationally viable techniques for the con-
struction of game–theoretical solutions to real–life problems has
recently become a central topic in Artificial Intelligence. Besides
several classical solution concepts, such as those of Nash Equilib-
rium (NE) and Correlated Equilibrium (CE)— see [16] for a thor-
ough exposition—, the concept of Leader–Follower Equilibrium
(LFE) has received the arguably largest share of attention, thanks
to its many applications, especially in the security domain [1, 9].
The computational study of LFEs is well assessed for the case of
a single follower who, in an equilibrium, is known to play w.l.o.g.
a pure strategy [17]. In this case, the problem of computing an
LFE is easy with complete information, whereas it is FNP–hard
for Bayesian games [3]. Solution algorithms are proposed in [3].
With multiple followers, different cases are possible depending on
the nature of the game they play. Applications can be found in,
among others, social planning (e.g., urban traffic plans and eco-
nomic markets), monetary economics (e.g., quantitative easing by
the European Central Bank), and security (e.g., NATO protection of
civilians in conflicts between more armies). Only sporadic results
are available in the literature. Among them, it is known that, if the
followers play a CE, an LFE can be found in polynomial time [2]
whereas, if they play sequentially one at a time (as in a classical
Stackelberg game), the problem is FNP–hard [3].
In this paper, we focus on the fundamental case of leader–follower
games with multiple followers where the latter play simultaneously
in a noncooperative way, thus playing an NE for any commitment
of the leader. We refer to the corresponding LFE as Leader–Follower
Equilibrium Nash (LFE–N).
The original contributions of our work are as follow. We pro-
vide, to the best of our knowledge, the first exact and approximate
methods to compute an LFE–N. We illustrate how computing an
LFE–N when the followers play an NE which either maximizes
(optimistic case) or minimizes (pessimistic case) the leader’s utility
can be easily shown to be FNP–hard and not in Poly–APX un-
less P = NP (i.e., it is unlikely that there is a polynomial–time
algorithm approximating the optimal value within an approxima-
tion ratio that depends polynomially on the size of the game), even
for polymatrix games. Thus, this problem results to be among the
hardest problems to solve and approximate. After highlighting the
clear bilevel nature of the problem, we propose different nonlinear
(and nonconvex) mathematical programs for the optimistic case,
resorting to global optimization tools that to the best of our knowl-
edge, have not yet been thoroughly applied in algorithmic game
theory. For the pessimistic case, where well–established techniques
to cast the corresponding bilevel program into a compact single
level one do not apply, we propose a method based on the com-
bination of global optimization and black box optimization tech-
niques. We also tailor our methods for polymatrix games, which
play an important role in leader–follower scenarios, e.g., in secu-
rity domains where the defender (acting as the leader) may need
to optimize against multiple uncoordinated attackers (acting as the
followers). We provide a thorough experimental evaluation of our
methods on a standard (normal–form and polymatrix) testbed gen-
erated with GAMUT [11], employing different global optimization
solvers—BARON [13] and SCIP [15], based on spatial branch–
and–bound, and CPLEX [6], based on branch–and–bound—and
local optimization solvers—RBFOpt [5], based on black box opti-
mization, and SNOPT [8], based on sequential quadratic program-
ming. We show that our global optimization methods solve ex-
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actly game instances with a size (e.g., with three players, 9 and
15 actions per player in normal–form and polymatrix games, re-
spectively) similar to that of the largest instances solved by state–
of–the–art NE finding algorithms (less than 10 actions with three
players [12]), while they provide very good approximations (with
a multiplicative gap smaller than 35% for normal–form games and
30% for polymatrix games) up to instances with three players and
more than 40 and 45 actions per player in normal–form and poly-
matrix games, respectively, corresponding to more than 64,000 dif-
ferent outcomes.
2. PRELIMINARIES AND COMPLEXITY
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of agents and, for each i ∈ N ,
let Ai be the corresponding set of actions, with mi = |Ai|. For
each agent i ∈ N , we denote by xi ∈ [0, 1]mi , with eTxi = 1
(where e is the all–one vector), his strategy vector (or strategy,
for short), where each component xai represents the probability by
which agent i plays action a ∈ Ai. We denote a strategy pro-
file, i.e., the collection of the strategies of the different agents, by
x = (x1, . . . , xn). Let ui(x1, . . . , xn) be the expected utility of
agent i ∈ N . A strategy profile x = (x1, . . . , xn) is an NE if and
only if, for each agent i ∈ N , ui(x1, . . . , xn) ≥ ui(x′1, . . . , x′n)
for any strategy profile x′ where x′j = xj for all j ∈ N \ {i} and
x′i 6= xi (no unilateral deviation). We consider two game classes:
Normal–Form (NF) and PolyMatrix (PM).
For NF games [16], let Ui ∈ Rm1×...×mn denote, for each
agent i ∈ N , his (multidimensional) utility (or payoff) matrix,
where each component Ua1,...,ani denotes the utility of agent i
when all the agents play actions a1, . . . , an. Given a strategy pro-
file (x1, . . . , xn), the expected utility of agent i ∈ N is defined by
the multilinear function ui(x1, . . . , xn) = xTi
(
Ui ·∏j∈N\{i} xj)
(an nth–degree polynomial).
For PM games [18], we have a matrix Uij ∈ Rmi×mj per
pair of agents i, j ∈ A. Given a strategy profile (x1, . . . , xn),
the expected utility of agent i is defined as the bilinear function
ui(x1, . . . , xn) =
∑
j∈N\{i} x
T
i Uijxj (a 2nd–degree polynomial).
By virtue of the correctness of the mathematical programming
formulations that we will propose, an LFE–N is guaranteed to exist
when the followers maximize the leader’s expected utility (opti-
mistic case). Differently, it may not exist in the pessimistic case, as
it is known for the case with a single follower [17].
It can be shown that computing an optimistic or a pessimistic
LFE–N is FNP–hard and, unless P = NP , does not admit any
polytime approximation algorithm with a ratio that is polynomial
in the size of the game. Due to our paper being mainly experimen-
tal, we discuss this result, which is necessary to characterize the
hardness of the problem, in Appendix A. Furthermore, as we dis-
cuss in Appendix A, it can be shown that the problem of deciding
whether an action of the leader can be safely discarded (because
always played with 0 probability in an LFE–N) is NP–hard. In
this work, we mostly focus on the most general case where both
the leader and the followers play mixed strategies. We also tackle
the case where the leader plays only pure strategies, as it allows for
more efficient algorithms1.
3. ALGORITHMS AND METHODS
1The case where leader and followers play only pure strategies is trivial in both op-
timistic and pessimistic versions, as it can be solved in O(mn) by enumeration, as
much as the case where the leader plays mixed strategies and the followers are al-
lowed to play only pure strategies in the optimistic version, which is solved by solving
O(mn−1) linear programs. The pessimistic version of the latter can be tackled with
the same techniques that we propose for the fully mixed case.
In the following, we assume that the nth agent, whom we relabel
as agent `, takes the leader’s role. We denote the other agents (the
followers) by the set F = N \ {`}. For the sake of presentation,
we present our formulations for n = 3 (one leader, two followers)
although they can be easily adapted to any n (see our computational
experiments for up to n = 6). Let thus F = {1, 2}. For all f ∈ F ,
we will adopt the notation f ′ := F \ {f}. We will also denote x`
by δ and x1, x2 by ρ1, ρ2.
The computation of an LFE–N amounts to solving a bilevel pro-
gram. In the first level, we look for a strategy δ while, in the second
level and for the given δ, we look for two strategies ρ1, ρ2 forming
an NE which either maximizes (optimistic case) or minimizes (pes-
simistic case) the leader’s utility. In the general case (under mild
technical assumptions), if we assume the convexity of the second
level problem, bilevel programs can be cast as (compact) single
level mathematical programs by substituting for the second level
problem its KKT conditions [7].
For the Optimistic (O) version of LFE–N, the optimality condi-
tions are not needed, as we can turn the second level problem into
one of pure feasibility over which the leader has full control: the
leader looks for a strategy vector δ and, given δ, also for an NE
in the follower’s game such that his utility is maximized. As we
will show, this allows us to solve the problem exactly via (nonlin-
ear) mathematical programming. For the Pessimistic (P) version
of LFE–N, we clearly cannot get rid of the second level objec-
tive function as the leader cannot control which NE the followers
choose. Moreover, KKT conditions do not yield a compact refor-
mulation, as even the sole feasible region of the second level prob-
lem (which corresponds to the set of NEs of a game, parameterized
by δ) is highly nonconvex [16]. For this case, we resort to (heuris-
tic) black box optimization techniques, assuring only a lower bound
on the leader’s utility in an optimal LFE–N.
3.1 Leader in Mixed strategies and Followers
in Mixed stragies (LMFM)
We first focus on the optimistic case for NF and PM games. We
propose three different exact mathematical programming formula-
tions for NF games and illustrate how they simplify for PM games.
We then address the pessimistic case, proposing a black box ap-
proach with an exact mathematical programming oracle.
3.1.1 Exact formulations for Optimistic Normal Form
LMFM games (O–NF–LMFM)
O–NF–LMFM–I.
Let, for each f ∈ F , vf be his best response value. We start
with a formulation obtained by casting the second level problem as
a Linear Complementarity Problem (LCP) which, as the followers
play an NF game parameterized by the leader’s strategy δ, becomes,
rather than linear, bilinear for n = 3:
max
∑
i∈A`
∑
j∈A1
∑
k∈A2
δ
i
ρ
j
1ρ
k
2U
ijk
` s.t. (1)
vf ≥
∑
i∈A`
∑
k∈A
f′
δ
i
ρ
k
f′U
ijk
f ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (2)
∑
j∈Af
ρ
j
f
(
vf −
∑
i∈A`
∑
k∈A
f′
δ
i
ρ
k
f′U
ijk
f
)
= 0 ∀f ∈ F (3)
∑
i∈A`
δ
i
= 1, δ ≥ 0 (4)
∑
j∈Af
ρ
j
f = 1, ρf ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F. (5)
The problem contains |F | = 2 cubic constraints,m1+m2 quadratic
constraints, and a cubic objective function.
O–NF–LMFM–II.
For each f ∈ F , let ujf be the utility agent f expects when play-
ing action j ∈ Af and let rjf be the corresponding regret value. Let
Mf = max
i∈A`,j∈A1,k∈A2
{U ijkf } − min
i∈A`,j∈A1,k∈A2
{U ijkf }. Adopt-
ing a reformulation similar to that in [14], we remove the LCP con-
straints by introducing, for each follower f ∈ F , a binary vector of
variables sf corresponding to the support of the strategy vector ρf ,
so that, for any j ∈ Af , sjf = 1⇒ ρjf = 0. We have:
max
∑
i∈A`
∑
j∈A1
∑
k∈A2
δ
i
ρ
j
1ρ
k
2U
ijk
` s.t. (6)
u
j
f =
∑
i∈A`
∑
k∈A
f′
δ
i
ρ
k
f′U
ijk
f ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (7)
vf ≥ ujf ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (8)
r
j
f = vf − ujf ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (9)
ρ
j
f ≤ 1− sjf ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (10)
r
j
f ≤Mfsjf ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (11)
s
j
f ∈ {0, 1} ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (12)
Constraints (4)–(5). (13)
With this formulation we achieve, at the cost of introducing binary
variables, fewer nonlinearities: onlym1+m2 quadratic constraints
and a cubic objective function.
O–NF–LMFM–III.
This third formulation is obtained from O–NF–LMFM–II by first
carrying out the reformulation steps that are performed in a stan-
dard spatial branch–and–bound algorithm (employed to solve a non-
linear program to global optimality), and then tightening the result-
ing formulation via valid constraints. We restate each original mul-
tilinear term by introducing (iteratively) an auxiliary variable and a
bilinear constraint, as in Constraints (16)–(17). We obtain:
max
∑
i∈A`
∑
j∈A1
∑
k∈A2
z
ijk
U
ijk
` s.t. (14)
u
j
f =
∑
i∈A`
∑
k∈A
f′
y
ik
f′U
ijk
f ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (15)
y
ij
f = δ
i
ρ
j
f ∀i ∈ A`, f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (16)
z
ijk
= y
ij
1 ρ
k
2 ∀i∈A`, j∈A1, k∈A2 (17)∑
i∈A`
∑
j∈Af
y
ij
f = 1 ∀f ∈ F (18)
∑
i∈A`
∑
j∈A1
∑
k∈A2
z
ijk
= 1 (19)
y
ij
f ≥ 0 ∀f ∈ F, i ∈ A`, j ∈ Af (20)
z
ijk ≥ 0 ∀i∈A`, j∈A1, k∈A2 (21)
Constraints (4)–(5), (8)–(12). (22)
The advantage of carrying out this reformulation step a priori is
that, when explicitly introducing the variables yijf and z
ijk repre-
senting, resp., the products δiρjf and δ
iρj1ρ
k
2 , we can tighten the
new formulation. Indeed, for any x, y ∈ Rn, the linear equations
eTx = eT y = 1 imply the validity of eT (xyT )e = (eTx)(yT e) =
1, which translates into Equations (18) and (19). Overall, we ob-
tain m`(m1 +m2) +m`m1m2 quadratic constraints and a linear
objective function, yielding a tighter formulation.
3.1.2 Exact formulations for Optimistic Polymatrix
LMFM games (O–PM–LMFM)
For PM games, for any f ∈ F , the expected utility ujf for ac-
tion j ∈ Af (which is trilinear for NF games with n = 3, and
of order n in general) is defined as the linear (for any n) function
ujf =
∑
i∈A` δ
iU ijf`+
∑
k∈Af′ ρ
k
f ′U
jk
ff ′ . The leader’s utility is the
bilinear (for any n) function
∑
i∈A`
∑
f∈F
∑
j∈Af δ
iρjfU
ij
`f . As
a consequence, the PM counterparts to Formulations I, II, and III
contain, in general, fewer nonlinearities. Indeed, O–PM–LMFM–I
only contains |F | = 2 quadratic constraints and a quadratic objec-
tive (as Constraints (2)–(3) and Objective (1) become, resp., linear,
quadratic, and quadratic). O–PM–LMFM–II contains only linear
constraints, binary variables, and a quadratic objective (as Con-
straints (7) and Objective (6) become, resp. linear and quadratic).
O–PM–LMFM–III contains only m`(m1 + m2) quadratic con-
straints, binary variables, and a linear objective function. The latter
is derived, similarly to O–NF–LMFM–III, by reformulation of each
multilinear term in O–PM–LMFM–II; since, in the latter, the only
nonlinearity is in the objective, O–PM–LMFM–III is obtained by
just reformulating the products δiρjf it contains, for all f ∈ F and
j ∈ Af and adding the counterpart to Constraints (19). The three
formulations read as follows.
O–PM–LMFM–I
max
∑
i∈A`
∑
f∈F
∑
j∈Af
δ
i
ρ
j
fU
ij
`f s.t. (23)
vf ≥
∑
i∈A`
δ
i
U
ij
f` +
∑
k∈A
f′
ρ
k
f′U
jk
ff′ ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (24)
∑
j∈Af
ρ
j
f
(
vf −
∑
i∈A`
δ
i
U
ij
f` −
∑
k∈A
f′
ρ
k
f′U
jk
ff′
)
= 0 ∀f ∈ F (25)
Constraints (4)–(5) (26)
O–PM–LMFM–II
max
∑
i∈A`
∑
f∈F
∑
j∈Af
δ
i
ρ
j
fU
ij
`f s.t. (27)
u
j
f =
∑
i∈A`
δ
i
U
ij
f` +
∑
k∈A
f′
ρ
k
f′U
jk
ff′ ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (28)
Constraints (4)–(5), (8)–(12) (29)
O–PM–LMFM–III
max
∑
i∈A`
∑
f∈F
∑
j∈Af
y
ij
f U
ij
`f s.t. (30)
u
j
f =
∑
i∈A`
δ
i
U
ij
f` +
∑
k∈A
f′
ρ
k
f′U
jk
ff′ ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (31)
y
ij
f = δ
i
ρ
j
f ∀i ∈ A`, f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (32)∑
i∈A`
∑
j∈Af
y
ij
f = 1 ∀i ∈ A`, f ∈ F (33)
y
ij
f ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ A`, f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (34)
Constraints (4)–(5), (8)–(12) (35)
3.1.3 Black box method for optimistic and pessimistic
normal form or polymatrix LMFM games
For both the optimistic and pessimistic cases, we propose a black
box approach based on a Radial Basis Function (RBF) estimation,
relying on the solver RBFOpt [5]. The idea is of exploring the
leader’s strategy space (variables δ) with a direct search that, it-
eratively, builds an RBF approximation of the objective function,
relying on the solution of an oracle formulation for the objective
function evaluation. Given any incumbent value δˆ, the oracle solves
the (NF or PM) optimistic or pessimistic second level problem ex-
actly via one of our formulations, after imposing δ = δˆ. For
optimistic NF games, we propose an oracle formulation similar
to O–NF–LMFM–III, obtained from O–NF–LMFM–II by adopt-
ing a different reformulation with auxiliary variables yjk = ρj1ρ
k
2 ,
which is tighter than that obtained from O–NF–LMFM–III when δ
is given. It only contains a quadratic objective, linear constraints,
and binary variables. For PM games, the oracle formulation is a
Mixed–Integer Linear Program (MILP). For the pessimistic cases,
the leader’s utility is minimized. Notice that, in this last case, we
might search for an equilibrium that does not exists. Nevertheless,
our method would return an approximate solution in any case since
the solution space we explore (leader’s strategy space) is finite. For
a given δ, the two oracle formulation read as follows (we report
only the optimistic versions, the pessimistic counterparts can be
obtained by simply replacing max with min in the objective func-
tion).
The formulation reads:
O/P–NF/PM–LMFM–BlackBox, oracle formulation
max
∑
i∈A`
∑
j∈A1
∑
k∈A2
δ
i
y
jk
U
ijk
` s.t. (36)
u
j
f =
∑
i∈A`
∑
k∈A
f′
δ
i
ρ
k
f′U
ijk
f ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (37)
y
jk
= ρ
j
1ρ
k
2 ∀j ∈ A1, k ∈ A2 (38)∑
j∈A1
∑
k∈A2
y
jk
f = 1 (39)
y
jk ≥ 0 ∀j ∈ A1, k ∈ A2 (40)
Constraints (5), (8)–(12). (41)
3.2 Leader in pure strategies and followers in
mixed strategies (LPFM)
We focus on the case in which the leader is restricted to pure
strategie. This case is of interest when the followers can see the ac-
tion actually played by the leader and, therefore, the leader cannot
commit to a mixed strategy. Here, we propose an ad hoc implicit
enumeration algorithm, more efficient than solving the previously
proposed formulations. Since a solution can be found by solving
any of our formulations after imposing δ ∈ {0, 1}m` , and the
LMFM counterpart to O–NF–LPFM–III contains, as we will see,
fewer nonlinearities than the original one, we report it for compar-
isons.
3.2.1 O–NF/PM–LPFM–Implicit–Enumeration
Due to δ ∈ {0, 1}m` , an LFE–N can be found by solving m`
times one of our formulations, iteratively fixing δ = ei (where
ei is the all zero vector with a single 1 in position i), and select-
ing the best outcome. The idea of the algorithm is of pruning
the search space A`, thus solving fewer subproblems, relying on
a bounding technique. For each of the leader’s actions, we com-
pute the utility he would obtain if the followers played a CE. This
yields a UB, as the set of correlated strategies is a (strict) superset
of that of mixed strategies. We can thus iterate over i ∈ A` and
solve one of our formulations with δ = ei only if the UB with
δ = ei is better than the best solution found thus far. The algorithm
reads:
1: for i ∈ A` do
2: UB(i) = BestCorrelatedEquilibrium(i)
3: end for
4: A` = DescendingSort(A`, UB)
5: LB = −∞
6: for i ∈ A` and UB(i) > LB do
7: LB = max{LB,Utility(ei)}
8: end for
BestCorrelatedEquilibrium(i) finds a UB with δ = ei by com-
puting a CE in polynomial time via linear programming, along
the lines of [16]. After sorting the leader’s actions in decreasing
order of UB via DescendingSort(A`, UB), the algorithm iter-
ates over A`, computing with Utility(ei) the exact utility when
δ = ei, only if UB(i) is sufficiently promising. In our implemen-
tation, Utility(ei) solves the same oracle formulations adopted in
the black box method.
3.2.2 O–NF–LPFM–III
For δ ∈ {0, 1}m` , the (quadratic) Constraints (16) in O–NF–
LMFM–III can be dropped in favor of the following three linear
constraints:
y
ij
f ≤ δi ∀i ∈ A`, f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (42)
y
ij
f ≤ ρjf ∀i ∈ A`, f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (43)
y
ij
f ≥ δi + ρjf − 1 ∀i ∈ A`, f ∈ F, j ∈ Af . (44)
Together with yijf ≥ 0, these constraints constitute the so–called
McCormick envelope [10] of the set {(yijf , δi, ρjf ) ∈ [0, 1]3 :
zijf = δ
iρjf}. When either δi ∈ {0, 1} or ρjf ∈ {0, 1}, the
envelope yields an exact reformulation. Thus, the only nonlinear
constraints in O–NF–LPFM–III are Constraints (17). The resulting
formulation is the following one:
max
∑
i∈A`
∑
j∈A1
∑
k∈A2
z
ijk
U
ijk
` s.t. (45)
u
j
f =
∑
i∈A`
∑
k∈A
f′
y
ik
f′U
ijk
f ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (46)
∑
i∈A`
δ
i
= 1, δ ∈ {0, 1}m` (47)
Constraint (5), (8)–(12), (17)–(21), (42)–(44). (48)
3.2.3 O–PM–LPFM–III
In O–PM–LMFM–III, the only nonlinearities are due to the con-
straints yijf = δ
iρjf . Applying, due to δ ∈ {0, 1}m` , the Mc-
Cormick envelope, we can remove all the nonlinearities from the
problem. O–PM–LPFM–III is, thus, a mixed-integer linear pro-
gram and it reads as follows:
max
∑
i∈A`
∑
f∈F
∑
j∈Af
y
ij
f U
ij
`f s.t. (49)
u
j
f =
∑
i∈A`
δ
i
U
ij
f` +
∑
k∈A
f′
ρ
k
f′U
jk
ff′ ∀f ∈ F, j ∈ Af (50)
∑
i∈A`
δ
i
= 1, δ ∈ {0, 1}m` (51)
Constraints (5), (8)–(12),(18), (20), (42)–(44). (52)
4. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
Our testbed is composed of instances of two GAMUT classes,
(Uniform) RandomGames (which are normal form games) and
PolymatrixGames, generated with payoffs in [0, 100] and the
same number of actions m for each agent, with 10 different in-
stances per value of m and game class. For some experiments,
we will also consider other GAMUT classes of structured normal
form games, as better explained in the following. We experiment
on games with an increasingm, so to assess how our methods scale
with the game size. We select m ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 10, 15, . . . , 50} for
n = 3 (2 followers) and m ∈ {2, 3, . . . , 10} for n ≥ 4 (≥ 3 fol-
lowers). We will compare the results of our experiments w.r.t. com-
puting time (in seconds) and (multiplicative) optimality gap2. For
both values, we will report the arithmetic average for each game
class and value of m over the 10 corresponding instances.
We adopt five solvers: BARON 13.0.1 and SCIP 3.0.0 (for glob-
ally optimal solutions to every formulation, apart from O–PM–
LPFM–III, which is an MILP), CPLEX 12.6.2 (for globally optimal
solutions to O–PM–LPFM–III, as well as to the oracle formulation’
for PM games in the implicit enumeration and black box methods),
SNOPT 7.4.2 (for locally optimal solutions to the formulations with
purely continuous variables), and RBFOpt 1.1.0 as a heuristic for
both the optimistic and pessimistic cases of LFE–N. The O–NF–
LPFM–Implicit–Enumeration algorithm is implemented in C. The
experiments are run on a UNIX computer with a dual quad–core
CPU at 2.33 GHz, equipped with 8 GB of RAM, within a time limit
of 3600 seconds. Each algorithm is run using a single thread. For
the exact methods, we halt the execution whenever the optimality
gap reaches3 10−12%.
4.1 O–NF–LMFM–I, II, and III (n = 3)
We compare the different NF formulations when solved with
BARON and SCIP. The average computing time and optimality
gap for each combination of formulation and solver is reported,
for RandomGames instances, in Fig. 1, as a function of m. (For
the sake of clarity we report data for m up to 25.)
The results are opposite for the two solvers. BARON better
performs on O–NF–LMFM–I (the purely continuous formulation),
while SCIP better performs on O–NF–LMFM–III (the “reformu-
lated” formulation obtained after removing nonquadratic terms from
O–NF–LMFM–II, containing binary variables and extra valid con-
straints). These results suggest O–NF–LMFM–I with BARON and
O–NF–LMFM–III with SCIP as the formulations which are most
efficiently solved with each global solver.
Inspecting Fig. 1, we notice that, with SCIP, O–NF–LMFM–III
always outperforms O–NF–LMFM–II, showing that the solver is
incapable of automatically constructing the reformulation obtained
with O–NF–LMFM–III.
As to the computing times, the largest m for which at least a
game is solved to optimality by BARON within the time limit is
m = 8 for O–NF–LMFM–I and m = 7 for the other formula-
tions. With SCIP, we reach m = 9 with O–NF–LMFM–III, and
m = 3 with the other ones. Although SCIP with O–NF–LMFM–
III and BARON with O–NF–LMFM–I have a similar performance,
the former requires a shorter time than the latter for any number of
2The optimality gap is defined as min{ UB−LBLB 100, 105}%, where LB and UB are,
resp., the largest lower bound (corresponding to the best feasible solution) and the
smallest upper bound found by the solver within the time limit. The min operator pre-
vents an unbounded value for LB = 0. Thus, an optimality gap of 105 highlights that
the method fails to produce a useful solution as, due to the payoffs being in [0, 100],
any strategy of the leader can achieve, at least, a utility of 0.
3Preliminary experiments with four tolerance values, namely, 10−12%, 10−9%,
10−6%, and 10−3%, showed, for a larger tolerance, a negligible reduction in com-
puting time by, at most and only in few instances, 2.5% with SCIP and 7.0% with
BARON. The stricter tolerance was thus preferred.
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Figure 1: Computing times and optimality gaps for NF–LMFM
formulations.
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Figure 2: Detailed results on optimality gaps with the most ef-
ficient solver/formulation pairs for NF games.
actions.
We report in Fig. 2 the corresponding statistical distribution of
average gap trends up to m = 40 with the two more efficient
solver/formulation pairs.4Also, in Fig. 3, we report multiplicative
and additive gaps for SCIP with O–NF–LMFM–III (the most effi-
cient profile). When considering such obtained optimality gaps,
SCIP remarkably outperforms BARON. As can be seen in Fig-
ure 1 (b),(d), the gap achieved by BARON with O–NF–LMFM–
I reaches 105% for m ≥ 20 (where the LB is 0 for almost all
the games, as a consequence of the solver failing to find a feasi-
ble solution in the time limit), while the average optimality gap
achieved by SCIP with NF–LMFM–III, see Fig. 3(a), is always
smaller than 30% even form = 40 while the worst case gap can be
upper bounded by 35% (see Fig. 2). Surprisingly, such result shows
how we achieved an almost constant empirical approximation fac-
tor contrarily to what the intrinsic difficulty of the problem would
suggest, namely an exponential quality degradation as the num-
ber of actions grows. Moreover, these results show that SCIP with
O–NF–LMFM–III always finds a feasible solution (a Nash equi-
4In this and subsequent boxplots, the red dash indicates the median, the box extends
from the 25th to the 75th percentile while dotted lines denote the whole sample distri-
bution; outliers are marked with a red mark.
librium) for the followers’ game, differently from the other pairs
of solver and formulation. For completeness, for the same pair of
solver and formulation, we also measured the additive optimality
gap, see Fig. 3(b), which, as of our experiments, is ≤ 15 for up to
m = 405. Games with m ≥ 45 actions were not solved due to
memory limits. Thanks to its very low optimality gaps (both mul-
tiplicative and additive), SCIP with O–NF–LMFM–III may consti-
tute a valid (empirical) approximation algorithm yielding, for up to
m = 40, a 6.5
10
–approximation6.
This trend is substantially confirmed by results we obtained with
other GAMUT normal–form game classes. In such experiments,
we evaluate the aforementioned formulation/solver pairs for NF
games of the eight GAMUT classes which we report, for the sake
of clarity, in Table 1. In detail: for each these classes we solve
10 random instances with 2 followers and m = 8 actions per
player; for each game instance, we compute an optimistic LFN–
E by solving formulations O–NF–LMFM–I and O–NF–LMFM–III
with BARON and SCIP, respectively.
Table 1: Additional GAMUT game classes
BertrandOligopoly BidirectionalLEGs
MinimumEffortGames RandomGraphicalGames
DispersionGames CovariantGames
TravelersDilemma UniformLEGs
The average computing times reported in Fig. 4 substantially
confirm the trends we observed for RandomGames, with SCIP
outperforming BARON, on average, most of the times. Surpris-
ingly, this trend becomes radically different for DispersionGames,
where SCIP performs less efficiently than for the other classes of
games, achieving computing times which are considerably larger
than those obtained with BARON. This is due to SCIP failing to
solve two game instances within the time limit.
4.2 O–PM–LMFM–I, II, and III (n = 3)
In Fig. 5, we report the computing times and the optimality gaps
on PolymatrixGames obtained with SCIP (the results obtained
with BARON are omitted for reasons of space). Within the time
limit, the largest m for which at least an instance is solved to op-
timality is m = 15, while, for m ≤ 10 all instances are solved to
optimality. Although the complete results are not shown for rea-
sons of space, for this class of games we can handle instances with
up to m = 50 before SCIP runs out of memory. We register a
worst case optimality gap below 30% (of the same order as the op-
timality gap obtained with NF games) for up to m = 50. This
5Additive optimality gap is defined as UB−LB.
6Use OPT−LBOPT ≤ UB−LBLB ≤ 3.510 = 35%.
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Figure 3: Optimality gaps with SCIP with NF–LMFM–III.
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Figure 4: Computing times obtained when solving formulation
O–NF-LMFM-I with BARON and formulation O–NF–LMFM-
III with SCIP for different GAMUT classes of games.
suggests that, on PM games, SCIP with O–PM–LMFM–III may
constitute an empirical approximation algorithm for instances with
up to m = 50, empirically yielding a (as in the normal–form case,
almost constant) 7
10
–approximation. Similarly to what done before,
we report (see Fig. 6) statistical details of the results obtained with
such formuation for time and optimality gaps.
4.3 O–NF–LMFM–I, local optimization (n =
3)
We report, in Fig. 7, the experimental results obtained with SNOPT
for RandomGames. Due to the local optimization nature of the
solver for nonconvex problems, to obtain statistically more relevant
results, we run 30 restarts with different initial starting solutions,
sampled uniformly at random from the simplices of the strategies
of the three agents, and return the best solution found. Fig. 7(a)
shows that the computing times with SNOPT (cumulated over the
30 random restarts) are much shorter than the computing times re-
quired by the global solvers, allowing for the solution (to a local
optimum) of almost all the instances with m = 50 within the time
limit. Differently, as shown in Fig. 7(b), the quality of the solutions
returned by SNOPT, measured as their ratio over the value of an
optimal solution, as found by SCIP or BARON, is rather poor even
with very few actions. Indeed, the median of the ratios is between
10% and 20% for games with up to m = 7. This suggests that
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Figure 5: Computing times and optimality gaps with SCIP with
PM–LMFM formulations.
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Figure 7: Computing times and LBOPT ratios obtained with
SNOPT with O–NF–LMFM–I within 30 random restarts.
resorting to local optimization (with random restarts) can be effec-
tive only when the global solvers terminate due to memory limits,
while highlighting the relevance of our approach based on global
optimization methods.
4.4 O–NF/PM–LMFM–III (n ≥ 4)
In Tab. 2, we report the average computing times obtained with
SCIP with employing formulations O–NF–LMFM–III and O–PM–
LMFM–III. In the time limit, we can solve NF games with up to
m = 5 for n ≤ 4 (corresponding to mn ' 600 different out-
comes and nmn ' 2, 400 different payoffs) and up to m = 4 for
n ≤ 6 (corresponding to about 4,000 outcomes and 24,000 pay-
offs). Quite interestingly, with our methods we can tackle instances
of a comparable size to that of the largest instances used in [12] to
evaluate a set of algorithms proposed to find a Nash equilibrium
(in a single level problem), in spite of our problem being clearly
harder (as it admits the former as a subproblem). With PM games,
our algorithms scale much better, allowing to find exact solutions
to PM games with up to m = 10 for n ≤ 9 and up to m = 7 for
n ≤ 10.
Table 2: Computing times (in seconds) with SCIP and O–
NF/PM–LMFM–III, within a time limit of 3,600 seconds.
Normal–form games
n /m 2 3 4 5
3 0.06 0.20 0.92 23.79
4 0.19 8.274 142.66 1304.45
5 278.06 409.78 2016.97 —
6 172.90 2350.95 2212.95 —
Polymatrix games
n /m 5 6 7 8 9 10
3 0.24 2.17 1.87 7.31 24.45 194.71
4 4.84 10.85 121.57 247.84 622.72 1947.54
5 7.51 90.83 332.04 1982.77 2396.01 2175.29
6 10.31 1169.50 2062.75 — — —
4.5 O–NF/PM–LPFM and
O–NF/PM–Implicit–Enumeration (n = 3)
We focus on the case where the leader is only entitled to pure
strategies. We report the results only in terms of computing times
obtained with SCIP for RandomGames in Fig. 8(a,b) and with
CPLEX for PolymatrixGames (for which the formulation be-
comes an MILP) in Fig. 8(c,d). By imposing δ ∈ {0, 1}m in O–
NF/PM–LPFM, the size of the largest instances solvable within the
time limit increases from m = 9 to m = 13 in RandomGames
and from m = 15 to m = 25 for PolymatrixGames. For
both RandomGames and PolymatrixGames, a dramatic per-
formance improvement is obtained with O–NF/PM–LPFM–Implicit–
Enumeration: with it, the size of the largest instance that we can
solve increases from m = 13 to m = 20 for RandomGames and
from m = 25 to m = 50 for PolymatrixGames. As expected,
the computing times for PolymatrixGames are much smaller
(due to only requiring the solution of MILPs at each step), allow-
ing us to solve to optimality much larger instances.
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Figure 8: Computing times on NF/PM–LPFM instances with
O–NF/PM–LPFM–III (a/c) and O–NF/PM–LPFM–Implicit-
Enum (b/d), using SCIP/CPLEX.
4.6 O/P–NF/PM–LMFM–BlackBox
We first consider the optimistic case for NF games, comparing,
in the time limit, O–NF–LMFM–III, solved with SCIP, to O–NF–
LMFM–BlackBox. For m ≤ 10, see Fig. 9(a), we observe, on
average, that the black box method yields solutions within 90% of
the optimal ones found with SCIP. This suggests that the method
might be sufficiently accurate. Unfortunately, for m ≥ 20, the
burden of calling SCIP to solve the oracle formulation becomes
too large, see Fig. 9(b), making the black box algorithm based on
RBFOpt highly impractical. Notice that the method allows us to
produce feasible solution also in the pessimistic case, although we
cannot verify the quality of the solutions it yields. An interesting
result, see Fig. 9(a), concerns the gap between the utility of the
leader at an optimistic LFE–N or at a pessimistic LFE–N. On the
instances solved to optimality (m ≤ 5), where we can verify the
quality of the black box solutions, we see that the gap is rather
small, suggesting that, in RandomGames, the leader could be in
the position to force the followers to play a strategy which provides
him with a utility not dramatically smaller than that which he would
obtain in an optimistic LFE–N.
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Figure 9: Performance of the Black Box approach for O/P–NF–
LMFM compared to O–NF–LMFM–III.
For the sake of completeness we also report, in Fig. 10, the anal-
ogous results obtained with polymatrix games. We compare, in
the time limit, O–PM–LMFM–III, solved with SCIP, to O–PM–
LMFM–BlackBox. Differently from the NF case, Figure 10(b)
shows that, for PM games, the computing time needed to solve
the oracle formulation, which is an MILP in the PM case, is much
smaller and scales much better with m. Except for the case of
m = 2, Figure 10(a) allows us to draw comparable conclusions to
those we drew for the NF case, with the leader achieving, in the
pessimistic case, solutions not too far away, w.r.t. his utility, from
the corresponding optimistic ones.
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Figure 10: Performance of the Black Box approach for O/P–
PM–LMFM compared to O–PM–LMFM–III.
5. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have provided the first computational study of game–theoretic
leader–follower situations where multiple followers play a Nash
equilibrium once the leader has committed to a strategy. We have
provided different algorithms and mathematical programming for-
mulations to find an equilibrium for the optimistic case where the
followers maximize the leader’s utility, as well as a heuristic black
box method for the pessimistic case. We have conducted a thorough
experimental evaluation of the different mathematical programs by
means of various optimization solvers, aimed at identifying the best
solver and formulation pair for both normal–form and polymatrix
games. Our experiments suggest that global optimization solvers
can be used as effective empirical approximation algorithms, pro-
viding a good optimality gap even for large games.
Among the challenging issues that we are interested to address
in the future, we mention the design of algorithms to find an equi-
librium when the followers play either a strong Nash equilibrium,
a strong correlated equilibrium, or a solution concept defined in
cooperative game theory.
APPENDIX
A. COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY
We tackle two LFE–N problems, the optimistic version:
O–LFE–N: Given an n–agent game with n ≥ 3, find a
strategy vector δ for the leader such that, after commit-
ting, the NE in the followers’ game, which maximizes
the leader’s utility given δ, yields the largest value for
all possible values of δ.
and the pessimistic version:
P–LFE–N: Given an n–agent game with n ≥ 3, find a
strategy vector δ for the leader such that, after commit-
ting, the NE in the followers’ game, which minimizes
the leader’s utility given δ, yields the largest value for
all possible values of δ.
We can state the following result.
Proposition 1 The problem of computing both an O–LFE–N or a
P–LFE–N is FNP–hard and it is not in Poly–APX unless P =
NP , even when the game is polymatrix.
Proof. In [4], the authors show that for any SAT instance it is possi-
ble to build a symmetric 2–player game (U1, U2) such that: i) there
is a pure–strategy NE in which both players play their last action
providing each player with a utility of  > 0 where  is arbitrarily
small, and ii) there are mixed–strategy NEs if and only the SAT
instance admits a YES solution and these NEs provide each player
with a utility of Θ(m), where m is the number of actions. This
shows that the problem of deciding whether such games admit an
NE providing the players with a utility strictly larger than  isNP–
hard and and finding a NE maximizing the social welfare is not in
APX . The result can be strengthen by setting  = 2m (notice that
these instances can be represented with a number of bits linear in
m), showing that no better approximation ratio than 1/2m can be
found in polynomial time and, therefore, that the problem is not in
Poly–APX .
We now extend this result to O/P–LFE–N. Given (U1, U2) with
m actions per player as defined in [4], construct a 3–player leader–
follower polymatrix game where:
• the leader ` only has one action and his utility matrices are
U`f1 = U`f2 = [1, 1, . . . , 1, 1/2
m];
• player f1’s utility matrices are Uf1` = 0 and Uf1f2 = U1;
• player f2’s utility matrices are Uf2` = 0 and Uf2f1 = U2.
It can be easily seen that approximating in polynomial time the `’s
expected utility with an approximation ratio better than 1/2m pro-
vides us with an algorithm to decide in polynomial time whether
there is an NE in (U1, U2) providing each player with a utility
strictly larger than . This shows that O–LFE–N is not in Poly–
APX unless P = NP even in polymatrix games (which are a
special case of normal form games).
For P–LFE–N, where the followers play an NE which minimizes
the leader’s utility, the reduction is the same, except for letting
U`f1 = U`f2 = [1/2
m, 1/2m, . . . , 1/2m, 1]. 
Furthermore, we show that deciding whether one of the leader’s
actions can be safely discarded is a hard problem, thus showing that
efficient dominance–like techniques are inapplicable.
Proposition 2 In a leader–follower game in which the followers
play the best (for the leader) Nash equilibrium, deciding whether
or not an action of the leader is played with strictly positive proba-
bility at the optimistic LFE–N isNP–hard.
Proof. Given a symmetric 2–player (U1, U2) with m actions of
the form used in the reduction in [4], we build a 3–player game
(U`, Uf1 , Uf2) in which:
• ` has two actions, while f1 and f2 have m actions;
• for the first action of `, the payoffs of all the players are 1/4;
• for the second action of `, the payoffs of f1 and f2 are those
in (U1, U2), while the payoffs of ` are 1 for all the actions
of f1 and f2 except for the combination composed of the last
action of f1 and the last action of f2, in which the payoff of
` is 0.
For the properties of such games, see the proof of Proposition 1.
We show that the first action of ` can be safely discarded from
the NF game (U`, Uf1 , Uf2) if and only if the game (U1, U2) ad-
mits a mixed NE. Therefore, the problem of deciding whether the
first action of ` can be discarded is NP–hard. If ` plays his first
action, he receives a utility of 1/4. If ` plays his second action, the
followers play the best NE for the leader. It can be: either i) the
pure–strategy NE in which both play their last action providing `
with a utility of 0 or, ii) it if exists, the mixed–strategy NE provid-
ing ` with a utility of 1. For any mixed strategy of `, the behavior
of the followers does not change w.r.t. the case in which ` plays
purely his second action. This is because, when ` randomizes be-
tween his two actions, the utility of the followers f1 and f2 is an
affine transformation (with positive coefficient) of U1 and U2 and,
therefore, they play exactly as in the case ` plays purely his second
action. Thus, it can be easily observed that, at an optimistic LFE–N,
` plays a pure strategy, playing his first action when (U1, U2) does
not admit the mixed–strategy NE and his second action otherwise.
Thus, if there is the mixed–strategy NE in (U1, U2), then the first
action of ` can be safely discarded, while it cannot be otherwise.
The claim follows. 2
REFERENCES
[1] B. An, J. Pita, E. Shieh, M. Tambe, C. Kiekintveld, and
J. Marecki. Guards and Protect: Next generation applications
of security games. ACM SIGecom Exchanges, 10(1):31–34,
2011.
[2] V. Conitzer and D. Korzhyk. Commitment to correlated
strategies. In Proceedings of the Twenty–Fifth AAAI
Conference on Artificial Intelligence AAAI, 2011.
[3] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. Computing the optimal
strategy to commit to. In ACM Conference on Electronic
Commerce, pages 82–90, 2006.
[4] V. Conitzer and T. Sandholm. New complexity results about
Nash equilibria. GAME ECON BEHAV, 63(2):621–641,
2008.
[5] A. Costa, G. Nannicini, T. Schroepfer, and T. Wortmann.
Black–box optimization of lighting simulation in
architectural design. In Complex Systems Design &
Management Asia, pages 27–39. 2015.
[6] CPLEX. http://www-
03.ibm.com/software/products/en/ibmilogcpleoptistud/,
2014.
[7] S. Dempe. Bilevel programming: A survey. Dekan der Fak.
für Mathematik und Informatik, 2003.
[8] P. E. Gill, W. Murray, and M. A. Saunders. Snopt: An sqp
algorithm for large-scale constrained optimization. SIAM
Journal on Optimization, 12:979–1006, 1997.
[9] C. Kiekintveld, M. Jain, J. Tsai, J. Pita, F. Ordóñez, and
M. Tambe. Computing optimal randomized resource
allocations for massive security games. In International Joint
Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems
(AAMAS), pages 689–696, 2009.
[10] G. McCormick. Computability of global solutions to
factorable nonconvex programs: Part I – Convex
underestimating problems. Math. Program., 10(1):147–175,
1976.
[11] E. Nudelman, J. Wortman, K. Leyton-Brown, and
Y. Shoham. Run the GAMUT: A comprehensive approach to
evaluating game–theoretic algorithms. In AAMAS, pages
880–887, 2004.
[12] R. Porter, E. Nudelman, and Y. Shoham. Simple search
methods for finding a nash equilibrium. Games and
Economic Behavior, 63(2):642–662, 2008.
[13] N. V. Sahinidis. BARON 14.3.1: Global Optimization of
Mixed–Integer Nonlinear Programs, User’s Manual, 2014.
[14] T. Sandholm, A. Gilpin, and V. Conitzer. Mixed–integer
programming methods for finding Nash equilibria. In AAAI,
pages 495–501, 2005.
[15] SCIP. Scip (solving constraint integer programs)
optimization suite, 2014.
[16] Y. Shoham and K. Leyton-Brown. Multiagent Systems:
Algorithmic, Game Theoretic and Logical Foundations.
Cambridge University Press, 2008.
[17] B. von Stengel and S. Zamir. Leadership games with convex
strategy sets. Game and Economic Behavior, 69:446–457,
2010.
[18] E. B. Yanovskaya. Equilibrium points in polymatrix games.
Lithuanian Mathematical Journal, 8:381–384, 1968.
